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On the Role of Heuristics  
– Experimental Evidence on Inflation Dynamics 
 








We carry out an experiment on a macroeconomic price setting game 
where  prices  are  complements.  Despite  relevant  information  being 
common  knowledge  and  price  flexibility  we  observe  significant 
deviation from equilibrium prices and history dependence. In a first 
treatment  we  observe  that  equilibrium  values  were  obtained  in  the 
long run but at the cost of a very slow adjustment and thus history 
dependence.  By  reporting  a  business  indicator  in  a  simpler  form, 
subjects were given the chance to coordinate their prices by help of a 
heuristic  in  a  second  treatment.  This  option  was  widely  taken, 
bringing about excess volatility and a deviation from equilibrium even 
in the long run. In a third treatment with staggered pricing we observe, 
contrary  to  theoretical  predictions,  the  one-round  ahead  (publicly 
known) shock is significant, but future inflation is not. Our findings 
cast light on price dynamics when subjects have limited computational 
capacities. 
JEL Classification: E31, C92 
Keywords: Inflation Persistence, Staggered Prices, Sticky Reasoning, New Keynesian Phillips 
Curve. 
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1  Introduction  
What drives inflation dynamics? Are subjects completely rational or is there some mental 
inertia?  Would  cognitive  limitations  hinder  rationality  and  may  this  bring  about  inflation 
persistence? We carry out an experiment where prices are flexible and information common 
knowledge.  Information  arrives  undisturbed  by  other  pieces  of  information  that  might 
otherwise  absorb  attention.  The  experiment  is  sufficiently  simple  such  that  not  only  the 
mathematically sophisticated will be capable of finding equilibrium prices. Although standard 
economic reasons for inflation persistence have been deleted we nonetheless observe that 
errors persist and carry over from one round to another. Prices are partly inherited.  
 
In  addition  to  player’s  abstention  from  optimizing  behavior  our  results  are  novel  in  four 
respects.  First,  we observe that players prefer to follow a heuristic  where this is offered. 
Without a heuristic the adjustment is particularly slow, errors persist longer and history is 
more important in shaping current prices. When a heuristic can be followed, this serves as a 
focal point to coordinate prices and is chosen although it generates excess short-run variation 
across time. Second, the heuristic has the power to divert prices away from their equilibrium 
value  even  in  the  long  run.  Third,  contrary  to  Akerlof  et  al.  (2000)  we  observe  that  the 
heuristic does not bias prices towards the status quo. Fourth, the heuristic diverts players away 
from recognizing future inflation as a determinant for current prices.  
 
Our findings are important in various ways. They allow reconciling theoretical predictions 
with empirical findings. Models with sticky prices predict that expected future inflation is 
important in determining current levels of inflation. In contrast to this, empirically the most 
important drivers for current levels of inflation are past levels of inflation. Our experiment 
may contribute to explaining this finding. A variety of policy conclusions is at hand, which 
will be discussed in the concluding section. 
2  Previous Theoretical Research 
How monetary policy may bring about not only nominal but also real effects is one of the 
most widely debated issues in economics. It has become standard to assume that anticipated 
policy shifts affect prices only without impacting output, (Lucas 1996). Real effects arise only 
temporarily  in  case  of  unanticipated  shocks,  when  price  adjustments  remain  incomplete. 
Research has then focused on identifying reasons for such a short-run incompleteness of price 
adjustments. Early writers have tried to trace this to adaptive forecasting rules where history 
shapes at least some of the prices in an economy. Haltiwanger and Waldman (1985) make the 
point that only few adaptive players would be needed to produce substantial frictions in the 
adjustment of prices. But overall, assumptions regarding adaptive expectations, resting on the 
failure of economic agents to draw rational inferences from publicly known data, did not find 
widespread  support.  The  standard  approach  has  been  to  look  for  objective  factors  for 
incomplete price adjustments, rather than limits to rationality. 
  
One avenue has been provided by sticky-price models, where price adjustments are either 
costly or temporarily impeded. Even if only a small fraction of agents faces such restrictions, 
the aggregate impact could be large. This is due to prices being strategic complements, (Ball 
and Romer 1990). Even those who are able to adjust their price will do so only cautiously, as 
they observe others whose price remains fixed. Sticky price models have thus been regarded a 
key to understand inflation dynamics. Taylor (1980) proposed a model with staggered pricing 
where price setters alternate in their capacity to adjust prices. Calvo (1983) suggested that  
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agents are  randomly allowed to  adjust prices, this capacity  arriving subject to a Poisson-
process. These approaches have been observed to imply that current levels of inflation depend 
on expectations of future inflation. Agents who can adjust prices today will form expectations 
about future inflation. They seek to optimize their price level not only with respect to the 
current but also to subsequent rounds when they are impeded from adjusting their price. The 
resulting equation for inflation dynamics is known as the New Keynesian Phillips Curve, 
NKPC,  (Clarida,  Gali  and  Gertler  1999;  Woodford  2003;  Romer  2006:  309).  A  standard 
version is πt = βEtπt+1 + γyt, with πt being inflation in period t, Etπt+1 being expected inflation 
formed in period t with respect to period t+1, and y the output gap.   
 
From a theoretical perspective the NKPC produced some unease. Romer (2006: 332) notes 
that in response to a boom (the output gap y being positive), expected future inflation, Etπt+1, 
must  be  smaller  than  current  inflation,  πt.  This  runs  counter  to  intuition  as  a  boom  is 
commonly linked to fears of increasing inflation. Also empirically the evidence on the NKPC 
is rather mixed. While future levels of inflation are commonly found to be significant, also 
past  levels  of  inflation  obtain  a  noteworthy  impact,  (Fuhrer  2006;  Álvarez  et  al.  2006). 
Backward looking behavior, not only forward looking optimization, can be observed in most 
data. This deficiency has been addressed by some theoretical models, alas as criticized by 
Angeloni et al. (2006) in a rather ad hoc fashion: By the inclusion of automatic indexation for 
some fraction of the prices (Christiano, Eichenbaum, and Evans 2005) or by adding some 
backward looking players to the population (Galí and Gertler 1999). These models involved 
some limits on rationality in order to ameliorate theory with evidence.  
 
Another approach to explain inflation persistence rests on the idea of sticky information. Such 
approaches go back to Phelps (1970) and Lucas (1973). Mankiw and Reis (2002) introduce 
sluggish information transition in a model of  monopolistic competition. They  allow price 
setters  to  adjust  prices  at  any  time,  but  a  Poisson  process  determines  the  arrival  of  new 
information.  Information  about  shocks  thus  does  not  become  common  knowledge 
immediately.  Some  firms  continue  to  set  prices  based  on  outdated  information.  Past 
expectations of current economic conditions become relevant to current behavior and account 
for the sluggishness of adjustments. Maćkowiak and Wiederholt (2009) go one step further 
and argue that price setters face a trade-off between paying attention to aggregate conditions 
and  paying  attention  to  idiosyncratic  conditions.  They  regard  these  cognitive  constraints, 
rather  than  information  being  unavailable,  as  being  better  capable  of  explaining  inflation 
dynamics. Nominal aggregate shocks thus exert real influence because firms are cognitively 
occupied with firm-specific information. Only when aggregate shocks are sufficiently large 
would they be able to attract aggregate attention and exert a more substantial impact. Sticky 
information in their view is the result of rational inattention.  
 
This idea can already be traced back to the work by Akerlof et al. (2000). The authors argue 
that  agents  will  depart  from  optimizing  behavior  and  use  simplified  abstractions  instead. 
Referring  to  the  work  of  psychologists,  they  argue  that  decisions  are  based  on  heuristics 
instead, which remain in use as long as the resulting mistakes are not too severe. The authors 
assume a tendency to ignore signals that imply low levels of inflation. Players confronted 
with such signals will disregard them and thus fail to adjust their prices accordingly. The 
heuristic would thus be to keep prices constant unless information goes beyond a certain 
threshold.  
 
Our  study  reveals  some  similarity.  We  observe  that  players  use  past  levels  of  prices  to 
function as a starting point for setting current prices. But we posit that it is not inattention that  
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drives  agents  and  it  is  not  price  stability  that  operates  as  a  heuristic.  Players  are  instead 
observed to make use of a signal that, in our study, generates excess variation of prices across 
time and drives prices away from their equilibrium level even in the long run. Lack of a 
heuristic, to the contrary, does not motivate players to more thoroughly optimize and thus 
approach  the  equilibrium  quicker.  We  rather  observe  an  even  more  sluggish  adjustment 
towards equilibrium where a heuristic is not offered.  
3  Previous Experimental Evidence  
Laboratory macroeconomic experiments have gained prominence lately, as evidenced in the 
comprehensive  survey  by  Duffy  (2008).  Simon  (1957)  was  among  the  first  to  posit  that 
rationality  imposes  strong  informational  and  computational  requirements  upon  individual 
behavior,  suggesting  that  simple  rules  of thumb  may  be  used  instead.  The  importance  of 
heuristics and how they bring about deviations from rationality were proven by Tversky and 
Kahneman  (1974)  and  Kahneman  (2003).  There  exists  a  rich  literature  that  applies  these 
insights  to  asset  markets.  There  are  few  investigations,  however,  on  the  link  between 
heuristics and the pricing of commodities. Such commodities differ from assets because they 
are produced and consumed in the same period, they are not stored and thus varying prices 
exert no direct impact on the wealth.  
 
Most  experiments  on  commodity  pricing  operate  with  limited  information.  They  link 
individual prices or price forecast with that of other players to determine individual payoffs 
by help of a pricing function. But this pricing function is not common knowledge, subjects 
know little about it. They are only given feedback with respect to past prices, forecast and 
realizations. Two variants of such experiments can be found. In the first variant there exists a 
positive  relationship  between  price  forecasts.  If  a  single  expectation  on  prices  rises,  the 
aggregate market price rises as well, giving reason to others to adjust their forecast upward. 
Price  forecasts  are  thus  strategic  complements.  The  opposite  is  the  case  for  negative 
expectations  feedback  and,  thus,  prices  being  substitutes.  The  main  challenge  in  these 
experiments  is  to  learn  to  forecast  correctly.  These  experiments  have  thus  been  labeled 
Learning to Forecast Experiments (LtFEs), (Hommes 2011). At the core of these experiments 
lies the question of whether equilibria can be approached by help of adaptive learning. Are 
rational expectations equilibria learnable? 
 
One  such  experiment,  Hommes  et  al.  (2007),  investigates  price  forecasting  in  a  simple 
Cobweb-model.  Six  subjects  operate  for  50  rounds  and  are  asked  to  forecast  the  current 
round’s  price  level  from  the  interval  [0,  10].  These  forecasts  are  used  to  determine  the 
quantity  jointly  supplied  by  the  six  subjects  and  the  realized  price  that  is  required  to 
equilibrate demand with this level of supply. Price forecasts are substitutes in this setting: If a 
subject forecasts an excessively high price she will boost supply, which lowers the realized 
price. A rational reaction by other subjects would be to reduce their forecast. Hommes et al. 
(2007) confront players with a stationary shock that impacts demand. Individual payoffs are 
linearly  decreasing  with  the  quadratic  difference  between  their  price  forecast  and  its 
realization. Three different treatments are investigated where naïve expectations imply price 
variation to be strongly unstable, unstable or stable. The authors do not find autocorrelation in 
any of the treatments, which leads the authors to argue that naïve expectations that might be 
exploited  by  others  were  not  obtained.  But  variance  was  lower  in  the  stable  treatment, 
suggesting that expectations were not completely rational. As pointed out by Duffy (2008), 
this may also be related to the limited information subjects had regarding how the model 
generated the data. Since the type of feedback is the main informational content in these  
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experiments  with  limited  information,  Heemeijer  et  al.  (2009)  test  the  different  speed  in 
convergence to equilibrium in experiments with substitutes and complements. They employ 
pricing functions which are similar to the one used here and the one by Sutan and Willinger 
(2009), where prices are determined by a function of the average guesses. In Heemeijer et al. 
(2009) prices exhibit some perturbance by white noise shocks. Again the pricing function is 
not  common  knowledge.  Heemeijer  et  al.  (2009)  show  that  convergence  is  faster  with 
substitutes than with complements.  
 
Another branch of experimental research, which acts under limited information as well, deals 
with  inflation  forecasting  in  complex  New  Keynesian  Dynamic  Stochastic  General 
Equilibrium Models. These approaches reveal some similarity to price forecasting games as 
they build on a similar mechanism, but this time assume forecasts being complements. The 
most prominent example is Adam (2007). He tests whether subjects can correctly predict 
levels of inflation that are given by a New Keynesian model and includes a NKPC. Five 
subjects were grouped together and supposed to predict inflation with payoffs increasing in 
the accuracy of their prediction. Past levels of inflation and output were reported to them. 
Their predictions were taken as an input to the model to determine the respective realized 
level of inflation. While subjects did not know the (complex) model, they might have been 
assumed  to  learn  its  dynamics  after  some  repetition,  thus  being  able  to  form  rational 
expectations.  As  noted  by  Duffy  (2008),  players  are  supposed  to  behave  somewhat  like 
econometricians, using possibly misspecified forecasting rules which they update in real-time 
as new observations become available. But players fail in achieving rational outcomes. Adam 
(2007) observes a deviation from rational expectations, which contributes to the persistence of 
output and inflation.  
 
A similar focus on the New Keynesian Phillips Curve can be found in the studies by Pfafjar 
and  Zakelj  (2009)  and  Assenza  et  al.  (2011),  embedded  into  a  complex  model  whose 
quantitative specification is not revealed not subjects. Assenza et al. (2011) employ subjects 
as professional forecasters whose must guess the two round ahead level of inflation that can 
be derived from a three-equation New Keynesian model on output, inflation and the interest 
rate, embracing a demand function, a monetary policy rule and the NKPC. They find that 
subjects employ simple  forecasting heuristics  for determining  future inflation. Pfafjar and 
Zakelj (2009) put their focus of different monetary policy settings to find out how inflation 
targeting, inflation forecast targeting or a Taylor-rule impact forecasting and thus the stability 
of inflation. 
 
Other experiments provide players with complete information. Fehr and Tyran (2001) gather 
experimental evidence on money illusion. They ask their participants to pick prices in a range 
from  1  to  30,  where  prices  are  complements.  A  matrix  is  shown  to  players  and  denotes 
nominal  payoffs  dependent  on  their  own  price  and  the  average  price  chosen  by  3  other 
players. Players are asked to divide these payoffs by the total average price to determine the 
actual  (real)  payoffs.  The  existence  of  such  a  matrix  implies  that  the  players  have  full 
information on the pricing function. Still, the presentation in form of a matrix without a given 
functional form complicates the reasoning process. Prices are set again as complements. The 
game  has  a  unique,  dominance-solvable  equilibrium.  After  players  had  time  to  learn  the 
equilibrium,  which  happened  quite  fast,  they  were  confronted  with  a  shock.  The  money 
supply shrank and a matrix with new payoffs was delivered to the players. About 20% of the 
players  chose  prices  above  the  equilibrium,  insufficiently  adjusting  their  price.  Even  in 
subsequent rounds prices remained slightly too high. This implies a short-run non-neutrality 
of money. Interestingly, the effect is almost absent when agents played against computers or  
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when the matrix denoted real rather than nominal payoffs.  In  Fehr and Tyran (2008) the 
authors  observe  that  adjustment  is  instantaneous  when  prices  are  substitutes  rather  than 
complements. This particularity is also found by Sutan and Willinger (2009) in a one-shot 
price guessing game also known as beauty contest. Again under full information subjects are 
closer to equilibrium in a complementary environment. 
 
Laboratory beauty contests are closely related to pricing models and have been employed to 
investigate the cognition of reasoning processes. Nagel (1995) and Stahl and Wilson (1995) 
report the results from such a laboratory guessing game. In this experiment subjects are asked 
to pick a number between 0 and 100. The player whose number is closest to p (0<p<1) times 
the average of all numbers chosen wins a fixed prize while all other players earn nothing. The 
iterated  elimination  of  (weakly)  dominated  strategies  implies  that  only  0  survives  as  the 
equilibrium  number.  However,  subjects  substantially  deviate  from  this  equilibrium  point. 
Average  numbers  are  usually  between  20  and  30  for  p=2/3  and  distributions  of  number 
choices show prominent spikes at 33 and 22. In order to explain these findings, both studies 
propose  some  boundedly  rational  refinements  to  the  process  of  iterated  application  of 
dominance: First, “level-0” players are defined to randomly select numbers between 0 and 
100, the average value being 50. This value then serves as a focal point for more sophisticated 
players.  “Level-1” players best respond to  “level-0” players, thus  choosing 33. “Level-k” 
players best respond to the assumption that all others are “level-(k-1)” players. With these 
adjustments, participants are found to obey two to three steps of iterated dominance rather 
than an infinite number (Nagel 1995; Ho, Camerer and Weigelt 1998).  
 
When being played repeatedly, in higher rounds “level-0” players stop picking randomly, but 
utilize the previous round’s average number instead. This implies that repeated play generates 
convergence towards equilibrium. But this convergence can be particularly slow and strongly 
dependent on how the game is framed, (Ho, Camerer and Weigelt 1998: 950; Duffy and 
Nagel 1997: 1699).  
 
We believe that subjects are limited in their capacity to set equilibrium prices, and thereby 
inflation, either because they have limited computational skills or because they do not belief 
that  other  subjects  can  calculate  equilibrium  prices.  Rather  than  sticky  prices  or  sticky 
information we would have another reason for a departure from equilibrium. We call this 
sticky reasoning. For our experiment we prefer models with complete information. Departure 
from equilibrium in LtFEs may arise when the true model has not yet been detected and an 
efficient rule for forecasting prices has not yet been found. Information that allows detection 
of  the  true  model  arrives  “sticky”  across  time.  In  order  to  isolate  the  effects  of  sticky 
reasoning from this adaptive learning process we focus on a design with full information.  
 
Our experiment is close to those by Fehr  and  Tyran
1 and almost as simple as the above 
mentioned guessing games. But we let subjects set prices for many rounds and confront them 
with  non-stationary  shocks.  To  the  best  of  our  knowledge,  while  non-stationary  data  are 
standard to macroeconometrics they represent a novelty in experimental macroeconomics. A 
non-stationary shock is cognitively demanding to subjects and allows us to observe how it 
impacts on the preference for simple rules rather optimization. 
 
                                                 
1 While Fehr and Tyran (2001, 2008) employ a complex payoff matrix, we provide subjects with the pricing 
function in order to facilitate the reasoning process.  
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We did not want to assume our subjects to take the role of econometricians, which might not 
match  their  layman  experience  and  thus  impair  the  external  validity  of  the  findings.  We 
preferred  to  set  up  a  model  with  heterogeneous  prices  where  players  assume  the  role  of 
producers that set prices for their products, and thus determine levels of inflation for their 
individual product, rather than estimating how heterogeneous forecasts may translate into a 
(future) homogeneous market price. This difference was more important for the framing of 
the subjects’ task and had a minor impact on the experimental design. 
 
Our preference for a price-setting rather than a forecasting experiment was motivated by a 
more fundamental concern. The NKPC assumes subjects to forecast future prices. But would 
boundedly  rational  subjects  choose  this  functional  form?  The  current  LtFEs  take  this  for 
granted and employ subjects only for investigating the quantitative characteristics of their 
play.  But  would  subjects  by  themselves  opt  to  apply  a  forward  looking  behavior?  Is  the 
theoretical assumption that sticky prices induce forecasting supported by evidence? Or would 
we observe subjects to abstain from forecasting and prefer to follow other types of heuristics? 
4  Experimental Design  
Sticky  reasoning  comes  along  with  a  series  of  conjectures  for  pricing  behavior  in  the 
laboratory.  First,  players  will  base  their  price  less  on  rational  calculation  but  on  history. 
Failure  to  iteratively  delete  all  (weakly)  dominated  strategies  results  in  price  adjustments 
being incomplete, just as numbers in guessing games, and history will remain important. This 
is likely to be particularly the case when players are confronted with (non-stationary) news. 
Second,  simple  usage  of  current  information  may  imply  excess  or  moderated  volatility. 
Limited steps of reasoning imply a failure to achieve equilibrium levels of volatility. Third, 
when offering a simple but costly pricing rule we expect the majority of the players to prefer 
this heuristic as coordination device rather than using past prices. Fourth, we do not belief that 
there is a sufficient amount of higher-level players to validate the NKPC. Instead, we expect 
future levels of inflation to be irrelevant for actual price setting behavior. 
 
In order to test our hypothesis we designed three treatments. With respect to the robustness of 
the results, each experimental design had to fulfill the following conditions:  
1.  Prices  should  be  complements,  which  is  standard  for  heterogeneous  markets  with 
Bertrand competition and appears to be adequate for macroeconomic environments, 
where prices across the supply chain positively impact each other.  
2.  Issues of fairness or cooperation should not overshadow the subject’s calculus. While 
such issues loom large in reality and have been widely researched in their impact on 
pricing behavior,
2 we want to identify the reasons why subjects may depart from an 
individual  optimum  that  they  want  to  achieve.  Our  focus  is  thus  on  non-standard 
expectations such as limited reasoning rather than non-standard preferences.  
3.  The game should exhibit an unique pure-strategy Nash equilibrium. The reason is that 
price  levels  should  not  vary  by  players  switching  between  different  expected 
equilibria. 
                                                 
2 Potters and Suetens (2009), for example, find that cooperation is easier when actions are strategic complements, as is 
commonly assumed for prices in Bertrand games. Cooperation is less pronounced when actions are strategic substitutes, 
which is the standard assumption for quantity competition in Cournot games.  
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In each treatment, subjects play 30 rounds t of a pricing game in groups of six players. Each 
player is confronted with the task of determining an individual price, which is affected by a 
business indicator BI. The payoff function P in each round t for subject i is defined as:     
     
t it it p p ˆ 10 - - = P  , with  ( ) 10 5 5 4 ˆ t mt t BI p p + + × =   and  ∑ = × =
6
1 6 1
i it mt p p            (1) 
 
Each player, i, is assigned the role of a producer who must determine a price level pit ranging 
between 0 and 100 for his product in round t. Each player receives 10 Taler as an endowment 
for each round. The endowment is reduced by the amount by which the chosen price pit, 
differs  from  its  target  value  t p ˆ   .  We  denote  the  average  price  chosen  by  all  six  players 
(including player i) by  mt p . The intuitive motivation for this interaction scheme is explained 
to result from other players’ products entering the production as an intermediary good. Also a 
raw  material  must  additionally  be  bought  for  5  Taler,  justifying  the  respective  value  in 
brackets. The last term captures the impact of the business indicator BI on the payoff function. 
High values of BI indicate a high target value for prices; low values signal a low target value.  
As a treatment variable we will change the announcement of BI, which is discussed later. 
What kind of equilibrium play is unraveled by iterated elimination of (weakly) dominated 
strategies in our pricing game? Suppose, at a business indicator of BIt=100 player i assumes 
all other players in his group to set prices in a way that  100 = mt p . By setting a price equal to 
the  other  players’  prices  player  i  would  earn  ( ) 10 / 100 5 100 5 / 4 100 10 - + × - - = Pit   or 
4 94 100 10 = - - = Pit Taler. This leaves room for improvement. Rather than asking for a 
price of 100 Taler, player i should set out to maximize his payoffs at pit =94 yielding a payoff 
of  10  Taler.  However,  assuming  that  all  other  players  also  behave  in  such  a  manner  the 
average price  mt p  will decrease to 94. Now, eliminating weakly dominated strategies will 
result in setting pit =89.2 Taler. Again, all players will adjust their prices so that the new 
optimal price will fall to 85.4 Taler. Similar to the beauty contest, the race to the bottom only 
ends once there is no incentive to deviate from average prices for any player. Assuming a 
business  indicator  of  BI=100  yields  a  dominance  solvable  unique  Nash  equilibrium  at  pit 
= mt p   =  70  (assumption  3).  More  generally,  the  equilibrium  price
*
t p   must  satisfy 
( ) 10 / 5 5 / 4
* *
t t t BI p p + + × = , which implies  2 / 20
*
t t BI p + = . Rational play results in setting 
a  price  equal  to  0.5  times  the  business  indicator  plus  20.  Past  levels  of  inflation  are 
insignificant.  
 
Figure 1 depicts player i’s best response function
3 given various levels of other players’ prices 
for BI=100. In this example, players will also observe that their own price increases in the 
mean price (which, as an aside, is dependent on their own choice of the price). This reveals 
that prices are complements, as required by assumption 1. Players may reach this conclusion 
more easily by assuming that the mean price is exogenous and observing that it positively 
impacts their own optimum price, an assumption that is not excessively wrong. 
                                                 
3 The response function is given by  ( ) 26 3 120 13 10 t it it BI p p + + = - , where   it p-
 
denotes the price set by 
all players other than player i
.
  




























Figure 1: Reaction Function for Optimal Prices with BIt=100 
 
What about the second assumption? May issues of fairness be salient among players? With 
BIt=100 player 1 may, for example, fear that all others choose a price that is too low, say 
p2t=…=p6t=45. If he also chooses p1t=45, costs would amount to 5. He observes that his own 
optimal price would be pit=50. By picking this price the mean price increases to  mt p =46, 
imposing an additional cost of 1 onto his colleagues. May the player abstain from setting 
pi=50 due to a concern for equity or fairness?  
 
This is unlikely due to two reasons. First, concern for others has often been found among 
pairs of players but less so in a group of people, where competitive pressure may be strong 
(e.g. Roth et al. 1991). Additionally, the player would have to bear costs of 5 in exchange for 
increasing the payoff of the other five players by 1. If we assume a player to care more about 
own than about other payoffs, fairness is unlikely to influence behavioral patterns. See Ho, 
Camerer and Weigelt (1998: 949) for similar assumptions related to guessing games.          
   
Definitely, price setting in reality is more difficult than in this experiment as we abstained 
from  e.g.  designing  heterogeneous  competitors  or  incomplete  information.  However,  we 
believe that the experimental design, and in particular the payoff function, are sufficiently 
simple so as to let subjects understand how their own payoff is determined dependent on their 
own play, that of others and exogenous variables. Moreover, all subjects are informed that 
others  in  the  group  face  an  identical  pricing  function,  suggesting  that  subjects  may  also 
understand other player’s calculus. Moreover, payoffs in each round do not depend on those 
in other rounds, disconnecting rational play from inter-temporal considerations. Nonetheless, 
we expect subjects to deviate from equilibrium prices because of sticky reasoning. Subjects 
are expected to fail in determining equilibrium prices or to expect such a failure from others.  
5  Treatments  
Our  BI  is  given  by  a  non-stationary  data  series.  To  be  more  precise,  the  data  generating 
process was a random walk of the type BI0= 50 and  t t t BI BI h + = -1 , with  t h  being drawn 
from integers [-15;15]. We generated different versions of this time series and chose the one 
where  all  values  for  BIt  were  between  0  and  100  and  where  an  ADF-test, 
t t t t BI BI BI n g g g + D - + = D - - 1 3 1 2 1 ,  produced  insignificant  coefficients  2 g and  3 g   close  to  
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zero. This made sure that the process did not, by random selection, turn out to be stationary or 
characterized by serial correlation.  While some real world business indicators tend to be 
stationary, others such as stock price indicators are non-stationary. We preferred the latter so 
as to confront players with some news while playing the game. While the dynamics of the 
business indicator was thus more demanding, players should understand that the dynamics of 
the first two treatments is simple: each round is played independently with no dynamics, apart 
from cognitive ones, by which the play in one round may impact the other.  
 
In the first two treatments we vary the way the business indicator is announced. In a first 
treatment, the business indicator, BI is reported  to subjects as  5 / t t BI BI = , thus ranging 
between  0  and  20  and  reported  with  one  digit  of  precision  In  order  to  yield  the  same 
equilibrium in both treatments the target price  t p ˆ  in equation (1) was given in the instructions 
as  ( ) 2 5 5 4 ˆ t mt t BI p p + + × = . This business indicator does not offer a simple method for 
coordinating prices. Its range and level of precision differ from those for prices. As shown in 
figure 2,  BI  also differs in value considerably from equilibrium prices. This implies that 




Figure 2: Business Indicator and equilibrium price 
 
 
In a second treatment the business indicator was announced differently. Subjects were given 
the pricing function in equation (1) and the values of the business indicator as  t t BI BI = . As 
shown in figure 2,  BI  tends to be close to the equilibrium price. It also ranges between 0 and 
100 and is reported in whole numbers. It thus reveals similarities to the range and precision of 
prices  that  subjects  must  set.  For  these  reasons  the  business  indicator  may  serve  as  a 
BI  
BI   
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coordinating device, a heuristic where prices are equated with the business indicator, pit= t BI . 
Our second treatment tests how such a heuristic impacts prices.  
 
Observe  that  the  differences  in  the  two  treatments  involve  a  mathematically  meaningless 
transformation without an impact on the equilibrium price 
*
t p . The values of the business 
indicator  BI  may be chosen as heuristic for level-0 play. Setting pit= t BI  is a simple rule that 
is  not  too  wrong.  Such  a  rule  may  be  attractive  for  two  reasons.  First,  players  may  be 
confronted with computational limitations and a simple rule allows them to economize on 
their cognitive efforts. Second, they may think that other players are confronted with limited 
computational capacities and take the heuristic as a starting point for their own computation. 
This kind of anchor facilitates the reasoning process.  
 
If  t BI =60, for example, the  BI -heuristic applied by all players, p1t= p2t= p3t= p4t= p5t= 
p6t=60, implies costs of 2. Assuming all other players to set prices in line with the  BI -
heuristic, a more sophisticated player will abstain from choosing the equilibrium price of 50. 
Observing that other players stick to the heuristic she will prefer only a moderate decrease in 
her price by 2. Such a player would believe that she is the only one to decrease her price while 
others hold their prices constant (level-0 players). She may also believe that others increase 
the price by 2 (level-1 players) and have reason to further slightly decrease the price. But 
these iterative steps of reasoning are likely to be limited. The adjustment towards the Nash 
equilibrium, which would be 50, is likely to be incomplete. Sticky reasoning does not imply 
that price adjustments are necessarily smaller than equilibrium adjustments. If the heuristics 
employed  generates  excess  volatility  of  prices,  sticky  reasoning  will  disallow  a  complete 
adjustment towards equilibrium prices and imply that some of this excess volatility remains.  
 
Our third treatment resembles the staggered pricing model proposed by Taylor (1980). Again, 
players face the payoff function that includes the heuristic  BI . However, price setters are 
now limited in their capacity to adjust prices. The first 14 rounds were designed identically to 
the  second  treatment  with  heuristic.  This  made  sure  that  players  have  a  substantial 
understanding of the game. Then, for the subsequent 15 round a staggered pricing scheme was 
implemented: In round 15 all six players in a group were allowed to adjust prices. In round 16 
only three players were allowed to adjust prices, while prices for the other three players were 
taken from round 15. In all subsequent rounds the capacity to adjust prices switched, being 
granted to those who previously could not adjust. E.g. in round 17, the other three players 
were allowed to adjust their prices, while the first three would play with their price level set in 
the  previous  round.  This  alternating  procedure  continued  until  round  30,  where  again  all 
players were allowed to adjust their prices.  
 
How would fully rational players behave in round t when they are allowed to adjust but know 
that they are impeded to do so in the subsequent round? We determine equilibrium prices 
following Taylor (1980). Players know all past and future levels for the business indicator 
such that equilibrium prices could be determined. We denote the average price level of those 
adjusting in round t by xt p   and that of other players who adjust in t-1 by ) 1 ( - t x p . Since fully 
rational players are predicted to play identical strategies the mean price is the average of the 
price currently set by three players and the one set by the other three players in the previous 
round,
 
) ( 2 / 1 ) 1 ( - + = t x xt mt p p p . Players observe that their price must maximize the payoff in 
two rounds, t and in t+1. Since the payoff function is linear in all prices and identical for both  
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rounds, any price can be taken between the optimal price in t and the one that is optimal in 
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Optimal rates of inflation are not trivial to determine. Prices in round 30 are flexible, their 
equilibrium value being 64.5 (disregarding here that whole numbers must be chosen). Using 
equation (4) allows determining prices in rounds 15-29 by backward induction. But also past 
prices enter the current calculus, for which predetermined values must be assumed. For a first 
round of iterations we chose flexible prices and substituted these by the values obtained in the 
last iteration. After 8 iterations changes were smaller than 0.01, suggesting a fair amount of 
convergence. The first differences of these values are plotted in figure 3. In equilibrium play 
we observe price volatility to be dampened considerably, due to future and past prices being 
relevant for current pricing decision. However, given the complexity of this treatment, we 
expect subjects to significantly deviate from the equilibrium prediction. As implied by sticky 
reasoning,  subjects  may  be  rather  limited  in  their  forward-looking  capacities  disregarding 
future rates of inflation. 
                                                 
4  This  can  also  be  rewritten  as  4 / 4 / 20 ) ( ) ( 1 ) 1 ( ) 1 ( + + - + + + + = - + t t xt t x t x xt xt BI BI p p p p p .  Please 
observe that this equation differs from the one commonly found for staggered pricing, (Taylor 1980; Romer 
2006: 332). In their approach only relative prices have an impact on payoffs, suggesting that the mean price 
impacts a player’s own price with a partial derivative of 1. We included also a fixed price for raw materials and 
the mean price to impact with a partial derivative of 4/5. This is the reason why the left hand side of the equation 
includes not only current inflation among price-setters,
 
) 1 ( - + t x xt p p , but also the current price,
 
xt p .  
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Figure 1: Optimal Inflation with Staggered and Flexible Prices 
6  Experimental Procedures 
The  experiment  was  conducted  computer-based  at  the  Passau  University  Experimental 
Laboratory (PAULA) using z-Tree (Fischbacher 2007). The data for  BI  or respectively  BI  
was common knowledge in all treatments because values for all 30 rounds were reported 
upfront (and everybody was told that values are reported to everybody upfront).  
 
Upon arrival, subjects were randomly seated in the laboratory and publicly instructed about 
the purpose of the game, its expected length, dos and don'ts and about (standard) payment and 
blindness procedures. In order to increase overall understanding of the rules, the first screens 
explained the game in a detailed manner using a step-by-step approach that was found to be 
perceived as intuitively appealing by pilot subjects (see figure 4 for an example). Questions 
by participants were not allowed at this stage.  
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Figure 4: Selected instructions – step 8 of 8 (English translation) 
 
Each step presented was also accompanied by three examples and subjects were given the 
possibility  to  (re-)calculate  each  example.  The  first  four  rounds  in  each  treatment  were 
reserved for learning, thus payoffs in these rounds were hypothetical. These four rounds are 
separated in figures 1, 6, 7 and 9 by a vertical line. Actual payoffs were achieved in the 
following 26 rounds. 6 groups played the first treatment where the BI-heuristic was absent. 
Another  5  groups  played  the  second  treatment  where  this  heuristic  may  be  used  as  a 
coordinating device. 9 groups of players played the third treatment with a staggered pricing 
scheme. Thus, each subject participated in only one treatment (between-subjects design).  
 
Throughout  the  entire  experiment  we  provided  feedback  on  all  relevant  information  (see 
figure 5). At the end of the experiment, each subject received the sum of Talers earned at an 
exchange rate of 1 Taler = 5 Eurocent. 
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Figure 5: Game sheet of 12th round from 26 played for pay (English translation) 
7  Descriptive Results 
The experiment was conducted in seven sessions of 12 to 18 students from the University of 
Passau over a one-week period in December 2010 and on May 30, 2011. In total, 120 subjects 
participated and formed 20 autonomous pricing groups. Subjects needed roughly 8 minutes to 
read  the  step-by-step  instructions  and  (re-)calculate  examples.  Total  payoffs  to  the  120 
participants amounted to 1,181.70 €. Payoffs per person were 9.85 € on average and ranged 
between 13.30 € and 4.80 €. The game on average lasted for 75 minutes, suggesting an hourly 
income of 7.88 €. This is in line with hourly salaries for student assistants.  
 
A  first  grasp  of  the  results  is  presented  in  figures  6-8.  All  individual  prices  of  the  first 
treatment  without  heuristic  are  shown  in  figure  6.  All  individual  prices  in  the  second 
treatment that does offer the BI-heuristic are shown in figure 7. Figure 8 depicts the prices 
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Figure 6: Individual Prices – Treatment without heuristic (treatment 1) 
 
Figure 7: Individual Prices – Treatment with heuristic (treatment 2)  
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Figure 8: Change in Average Prices among Price Setters relative to Previous Round,  
Data for 9 Groups (treatment 3) 
 
 
As figure 6 reveals, prices were quite volatile. This finding suggests that players may have 
experienced computational limitations. In that case, the higher variance may be explained by 
heterogeneous guessing schemes about the expected mean price of level-0 players. Figure 7 
corroborates  our  conjecture.  The  simple  BI -heuristic  has  a  strong  impact  on  individual 
prices. Players were willing to follow this heuristic although this implied that prices depart 
from equilibrium prices. As can be observed from the figure, this departure occurred in the 
short and in the long run. In the short run changes in BI were translated one to one to changes 
in prices, even though equilibrium play would have suggested adjusting prices by half of the 
changes in  BI  Even in the long-run, prices do not converge towards the equilibrium price, as 
becomes particularly visible in rounds 25-30. Also in the staggered pricing treatment (figure 
8), we fail to observe the dampening effect as predicted by Nash equilibrium play. Players’ 
behavior again seems to be highly guided by the  BI -heuristic attesting further coordinative 
power to it even under staggered pricing limitations.  
 
Figure 9 provides similar evidence. It reports the standard deviation in prices within groups as 
compared to the one between all individuals for treatments 1 and 2.  
  18 
 
Figure 9: Standard deviations – within groups and across all observations 
 
In line with figures 6-7, the standard deviation across all observations is largest where the 
heuristic is absent. However, the standard deviation among players within the same group is 
rather  low.  This  implies  that  the  large  standard  deviation  is  due  to  prices  differing 
considerably from one group to another, rather than within groups. The heuristic is capable of 
causing  different  group’s  prices  to  converge  but  also  to  reduce  deviation  across  all 
observations. The first rounds are characterized by heterogeneity, in particular during the first 
4 rounds that were reserved for learning. Afterwards, the standard deviation among prices 
remains rather stable. Figure 9 thus provides no indication of learning effects during rounds 5-
29.  
8  Regression Analysis 
Treatment with and without heuristic 
We focus on average group prices pmt for regression analysis and start by analyzing the simple 
long-run relationship between prices and BI. To allow for comparison we regress on BI rather 
than on BI or BI . 
 
t t mt BI p e b b + + = 2 1                                                                        (5)  
  19 
 
Method: Ordinary Least Squares.
a) 





















1 b  Constant  7.39  1.19  4.85 
(5.0)  (1.9)  (6.4) 
2 b  Business Indicator,  
BIt 
0.81  0.94  0.52 
(28.4)  (76.4)  (11.9) 
3 b  Lagged Price px(t-1)      0.41 









ADF on Residuals   -3.22  -3.44  -4.26 
R
2  0.84  0.98  0.97 
a)  t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
Table 1: Time Series Regressions for Average Prices 
 
We focus on the first two treatments and will interpret the third treatment later. Throughout 
the regressions in table 1 BIt obtains the expected sign. We carry out an ADF-test on the 
residuals,  et,  of  the  type    t t t t n e g e g g e + D - + = D - - 1 3 1 2 1 and  report  the  t-statistics  for  the 
coefficient  2 g . The critical McKinnon values are -3.48 (1% error level) and -2.88 (5% error 
level). In the first two treatments the t-statistics are smaller than the critical value at the 5% 
level,  allowing  us  to  infer  that  residuals  have  a  unit  root  and  both  regressions  depict  a 
cointegrating relationship. A note of caution is required. With only 26 observations per group 
convergence is not very strong and error levels may be measured with some imprecision. The 
time series properties are not very strong for tests on cointegration. Still, the results allow us 
to proceed by assuming a cointegrating relationship and capture the dynamic structure by help 
of an error-correction approach: 
 
t t t m t mt BI p BI p e b b f f + - - + D = D - - ) ( 1 2 1 ) 1 ( 1 0                                   (6) 
 
The last term depicts the long-run relationship from table 1, which is tested simultaneously 
with the short-term dynamics. Departures from the long-run relationship are denoted as an 
“error”, which groups of players seek to compensate by increasing or decreasing the average 
price.  Coefficient  1 f   denotes  the  speed  of  adjustment  with  1 1 = f   indicating  immediate 
adjustment  towards  the  long-run  relationship  and  lower  values  denoting  a  more  sluggish 
reaction. The coefficient  1 f  is not normally distributed; the critical values by McKinnon must 
again be applied.  
 
As can be observed from table 2, regression 1 for the first treatment with  BI , values are quite 
in line with equilibrium values. The long-term constant,  08 . 18 1 = b  is close to its predicted 
value of 20, and, as confirmed by a Wald-test, does not differ significantly from this value. A 
Wald-test on coefficients also confirms that the long-term influence of BI, as denoted by the  
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coefficient  60 . 0 2 = b , does not significantly differ from 0.5. We can thus comfortably argue 
that prices do not significantly depart from their equilibrium values.  
 
But we observe that changes in BI, as denoted by coefficient  79 . 0 0 = f , exert an excessively 
large impact. Players overinfer from changes in BI to the choice of the current price. This 
finding may replicate  what has been labeled an extrapolation bias.  In a variety of  games 
subjects have been found to overinfer from current, visible data at the expense of other more 
rational considerations. For a review see Fuster, Laibson and Mendel (2010). We also observe 
that adjustment is rather slow. With an error term  19 . 0 1 = f  less than 20 percent of past errors 
are corrected in current rounds. This error term, still, is highly significant with a t-statistics 
well  beyond  the  1-percent  critical  MacKinnon  value  of  3.46.  The  long-term  relationship 
between the average price and the business indicator is thus a cointegrating relationship.  
 
When the heuristic is available the coefficient  1 f is higher. This implies that the heuristic 
helps in achieving a quicker convergence. But the resulting relationship is not the equilibrium 
relationship. The constant is smaller than the equilibrium value of 20. The long-term impact 
of BI is larger than the 0.50 that equilibrium play implied and close to the value expected 
from the heuristic. Applying a Wald-test on coefficients reveals that their difference relative 
to equilibrium values is significant at the 1% error level. The same is true of the short-term 
dynamic. Changes of BI impact prices with a coefficient of 0.92, which is more than the 0.5 




Dependent Variable: Change in Average Group Price,  mt p D  
 Method: Ordinary Least Squares Error Correction Model.
a) 




0 f  Change in BI,  t BI D   0.79  0.92 
(17.0)  (28.9) 
1 f  Error Term  -0.19  -0.58 
  (-4.0)  (-8.1) 
1 b  Long-Term Constant  18.08  1.28 
(3.2)  (1.2) 
2 b  Long-Term BIt-1  0.60  0.94 








2  0.67  0.87 
a)  t-statistics in parenthesis.  
 
Table 2: Error Correction Regressions for Average Prices 
 
 
Staggered treatment with heuristic 
The optimal staggered pricing requires a high level of reasoning. Limited reasoning capacities 
may encourage “level-0” players to follow the BI-heuristic. In that case, “level-1” players will 
observe that the price they set must also fit for the next round. For this reason they will 
recognize the next round’s value for the business indicator, BIt+1. But will they recognize that 
players  in  the  next  round  look  one  round  ahead  also?  This  would  be  a  “level-2”-type  of  
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behavior,  where  the  two  round-ahead  business  indicator  becomes  relevant.  Complete 
rationality implies that the next round’s level of inflation becomes relevant. But will players 
recognize that px(t+1) should enter their calculus? Subjects will face computational limitations 
in carrying out these higher levels of reasoning. And even if they are able to compute higher 
orders of reasoning they may believe other players are incapable of doing so and thus prefer 
to stick to a simpler calculation. 
Our regressions in the third treatment focus again on average group prices. This time the 
average is taken across all players who are free to adjust their price level, pxt. With 9 pricing 
groups in the third treatment and 15 rounds we obtain 135 observations. We start by testing, 
first, whether a long-term relationship exists.
5 Players will recognize that prices set in the 
previous round cannot be changed and should thus have an impact on current prices. Thus we 
modify the long-run relationship to include lagged prices We estimated equation (7). 
t t x t xt p BI p e b b b + + + = - ) 1 ( 3 2 1                                                           (7) 
Findings are reported as regression 3 in table 1. The corresponding ADF-test reveals a t-
statistic of -4.26 for past residuals, showing that regression 3 is a cointegrating relationship at 
a 1% error level. We can thus employ it as the long-term relationship in an error-correction 
model. The simple test equation is thus  
t t x t t x t xt p BI p BI p e b b b f f + - - - + D = D - - - ) ( ) 2 ( 3 1 2 1 ) 1 ( 1 0                               (8) 
As can be seen from regression 1, table 3, the coefficients are similar to the ones obtained in 
the second treatment with the heuristic. The error term is significant at a 1% error level. But 
this specification leaves out two important variables, identified in equation (4). We observe 
that  the  future  level  of  BI  is  relevant,  as  well  as  the  future  price  level.  Given  the  error-
correction approach we thus include first differences for both variables,  1 + D t BI  and  ) 1 ( + D t x p . 
We do not include changes in past prices, because this variable is captured already in the 
long-term relationship.  
 
As shown in regression 2, table 3, only the business indicator obtains  the expected sign. 
Future  inflation  does  not  positively  impact  current  prices.  To  the  contrary,  the  impact  of 
future  inflation  is  negative  and  even  significant.  Players  take  the  next  round’s  business 
indicator into consideration. But they fail in carrying out another step of iterative reasoning, 
observing that their price should rise with that of players in the next round. In how far players 
anticipate future events can also be tested by checking the two round ahead business indicator 
2 + D t BI . As shown in regression 3, table 3, this variable is insignificant. Reasoning in our 
pricing game is limited to “level-1”.  
                                                 
5 Owing to the fact that BI is non-stationary we cannot directly test equation (4). We also cannot test first 
differences  of  equation  (4)  because  this  would  miss  a  cointegrating  term,  forcing  inflation  to  respond  to 
deviations from a long-term relationship.  
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Dependent Variable: Change in Average Price among Price Setters,  xt p D  
 Method: Ordinary Least Squares Error Correction Model.
a) 








0 f  Change in Business  
Indicator,  t BI D  
0.53  0.67  0.63  0.64 
(10.4)  (17.9)  (13.7)  (13.7) 
1 f  Error Term  -0.33  -0.34  -0.52  -0.49 
  (-4.1)  (-4.8)  (-6.3)  (-6.1) 
1 b  Long-Term Constant  9.3  6.87  -0.13  0.87 
(3.5)  (2.9)  (-0.1)  (0.4) 
2 b  Long-Term BIt-1  0.47  0.54  0.45  0.46 
(3.3)  (4.8)  (5.3)  (5.1) 
3 b  Long-Term Lagged Price  
px(t-2) 
0.47  0.37  0.58  0.57 
(2.8)  (2.7)  (5.3)  (4.8) 
2 f  Change in Future Business  
Indicator,  1 + D t BI  
  0.44  0.28  0.25 
  (9.4)  (6.5)  (6.2) 
3 f  Change in Future Price 
) 1 ( + D t x p  
  -0.35     
  (-5.0)     
4 f Change in Future Business  
Indicator  2 + D t BI  
    0.06   
    (1.5)   
5 f Change in Future Price 
) 2 ( 2 + D t x p  
      0.01 












2  0.64  0.81  0.77  0.77 
a) t-statistics in parenthesis.  
Table 3: Time Series Regressions for Staggered Prices  
 
We tested various hypotheses that may account for  3 f obtaining the wrong sign. One idea 
would be that some players consistently set their price excessively high while others set their 
price continuously too low. This heterogeneity among players would induce pricing in the 
staggered  treatment  to  follow  an  alternating  development.  Regression  4  thus  includes  an 
explanatory  variable  on  future  price  changes  that  arise  across  two  periods  ) 2 ( 2 + D t x p .  The 
resulting  coefficient  5 f   is  close  to  zero  and  insignificant.  This  may  indeed  hint  at  the 
described heterogeneity among players. At the same time it corroborates insignificance of 
expectations with respect to future prices.  
 
Overall we observe ample support for sticky reasoning. Players seem to follow the business 
indicator, BI, that provides them with a fast and frugal way of setting prices. They take into 
account only the next round’s level of BI, thus recognizing that their current price should also 
operate well in the next round when they are unable to adjust their price. But they fail to carry 
out further steps of reasoning such that future inflation would be recognized. Sticky reasoning 
is  responsible  for  history  dependent  play,  excess  volatility,  coordination  on  imperfect 
heuristics, and future inflation failing to obtain the expected, significant impact. Limits to  
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reasoning imply a preference for heuristics rather than forward looking behavior as a driver of 
inflation dynamics. 
9  Conclusions and Outlook 
Price-setting  in  a  non-stationary  world  is  cognitively  demanding  such  that  a  heuristic,  if 
available, is preferred to optimizing. Such a heuristic is powerful in coordinating price-setting 
and driving away prices from their equilibrium path. Contrary to Akerlof et al. (2000) we 
observe that such a heuristic does not bias decisions towards the status quo. Instead, it can 
generate excess volatility by overinference.  
Contrary to theoretical predictions we also observe that forward looking behavior, which is 
optimal an in staggered-pricing environment, is insignificant. In this complex environment, 
subjects are observed to apply only one step of iterative reasoning, thus recognizing only the 
next round’s business indicator but not future inflation.  
Our  results  bring  about  some  policy  recommendations.  First,  monetary  policy  may  be 
confronted with longer time lags, but these do not just refer to prices being sticky and price 
adjustment biased towards the status quo but also to heuristics driving prices away from their 
equilibrium values. Second, the costs of disinflation and the resulting sacrifice ratios depend 
on whether heuristics are at play. Research has mostly focused on anchoring rational player’s 
inflation expectations, for example by help of improved central bank credibility. A focus on 
heuristics may help better address the behavior of players with limited reasoning capacities. 
Third, evidence has been gathered that the costs of achieving price stability do not markedly 
increase when hyperinflation rather than high inflation prevailed. Ball, Mankiw and Romer 
(1988) relate this to the absence of nominal rigidities in a hyperinflationary environment. 
Heuristics provide another approach to this finding. Price stability may require a heuristic 
where  price  signals  are  credibility  anchored.  Such  a  task  may  be  equally  demanding, 
irrespective  of  whether  hyperinflation  or  high  inflation  prevailed.  Fourth,  observing  how 
firms set their prices, what signals they observe and who controls and designs these signals 
may be important in order to fully understand the conditions for price stability.  
Our findings also open avenues for future research. What are the real world cases of signals 
that serve as heuristics, such as explicit and implicit indexation rules or softer signals such as 
official announcements or media coverage, and how are they communicated? May players 
abandon one heuristic and shift to another? In how far can heuristics be the target of policy? 
May different heuristics survive within a currency union, distorting relative prices? How may 
dynamics  develop  when  sticky  information  is  added  to  the  model?  While  our  model  has 
broken new ground, we contend that much remains to be done to fully understand the actor’s 
cognitive mind map and the resulting policy implications.   
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